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# History of Economic Development



## Reading List Outline

### I. Introduction

Implications for Population Theory,” in Rosenzweig and Stark, eds.



, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 647-675.

O'Rourke, Kevin, 1985. "Did the Great Irish Famine Matter?"  
51, pp. 1-22.

O'Grada, Cormac, 2000.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press.

O'Grada, Cormac, 2005, "Markets and Famines in Pre-industrial Europe,"

Jones, Charles, 1997.

DeVries, Jan, 1994. "The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution,"  
 , 54(2), pp. 249-270

C.P. Timmer, 1998. "The Agricultural Transformation," chapter 10 of Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 1 edited by Hollis Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan.

Michael P. Todaro and Steven C. Smith, 2003. Economic Development. Chapter 10.

## **2. Changing Institutions: Political Foundations and Property Rights**

### **a. Property Rights on Land-- Enclosures**

*In the Middle Ages in Europe, much agricultural land was held in open, scattered fields with common areas for grazing. Why did an apparently inefficient institution persist for so long? What types of risks did pre-industrial households experience and how did the open field system help to smooth fluctuations in income? What accounted for the gradual enclosing of open fields into plots with private property rights?*

**Student's presentation:** Clark, Gregory, 1998. "Commons Sense: Property Rights, Efficiency and Institutional Change,"  
 , 58(1), pp. 73-102.

McCloskey, Donald, 1976. "English Open Fields as Behavior Toward Risk  
 1, pp. 124-170.

Fenoaltea, Stefano, 1976. "Risk, Transactions Costs, and the Organization of Medieval Agriculture,"  
 , 13(2), pp. 129-152; and the exchange between  
 McCloskey and Fenoaltea in the October 1977

McCloskey Donald, 1991. "The Prudent Peasant: New Findings on Open Fields,"



North, Douglass C., and B. R. Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice."



Greif, Avner and Murat Iygun, 2013. "Social Organizations, Violence, and Modern Growth," Vol. 103(3): 534-38.

Burke, Marshall, Solomon M. Hsiang, Edward Miguel, 2014. "Climate and Conflict," NBER Working Papers 20598.

Shiue, Carol H. "Local Granaries and Central Government Disaster Relief: Moral Hazard and Intergovernmental Finance in 18th and 19th Century China," March 2004, 64(1), pp. 101-125.

Shiue, Carol H. "The Political Economy of Famine Relief in China, 1740-1820,"

Jorge Baten et al. 2010. "Evolution of living standards and human capital in China in the 18-20th centuries: Evidences from real wages, age-heaping, and anthropometrics,"  
, 47(3).

Greif, Avner and Guido Tabellini, 2010. "Cultural and Institutional Bifurcation, China and Europe Compared," 100(2), May.

Greif, Avner, and G. Tabellini, 2011. "The Clan and the City: Sustaining Cooperation in China and Europe," <http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~bowles/ClanCity.pdf>

Keller, Wolfgang and Carol Shiue, 2014, "Capital Market Development in Europe and China, A Comparison", Working draft.

## **VIII. Modern Economic Growth—Fundamental Explanations**

*Why are some countries so rich and others so poor? Are there ultimate factors (geography, institutions, and culture) that have significant effects on cross-country performance today? Is there a hierarchy of growth factors, from proximate to deeper, and how might they be related? What are the separate contributions of these factors? What are the mechanisms through which fundamental explanations eventually impact on growth? How do cultural beliefs about gender, religion, honor, and trust shape economic growth?*

### **1. Geography and Factor Endowments**

Rodrick, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," 9(2), pp.131-165.

McArthur, John and Jeffrey Sachs, 2001. "Institutions and Geography: Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson," NBER Working Paper #8114 (2001).

Glaeser, Edward, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" 9(3) pp. 271-303.

Greif, Avner, 2006. , Cambridge University Press, Chapter. 2, pp. 29-55.

Acemoglu, Daron, James Robinson and Simon Johnson, "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World," , pp. 1231-1294.

Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, 2011. "The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution." 101 (December): 3286-3307.

Li, Ben, Wolfgang Keller and Carol H. Shiue, 2011, "China's Foreign Trade, Perspectives from the Last 150 Years" 34(6), pp. 853-892.

Jia, Ruixue, 2012. "The Legacies of Forced Freedom: China's Treaty Ports,"

Li, Ben, Wolfgang Keller and Carol H. Shiue, 2013, "Shanghai's Trade, China's Growth: Continuity, Recovery, and Change since the Opium War," , June 2013, 61(2): 336-378.

Keller, Wolfgang and Carol H. Shiue, 2014, "Capital Markets and Colonial Institutions in China" Working paper.

Keller, Wolfgang and Carol H. Shiue, 2014, "The Contributions of Institutions and Market Integration to Economic Development: Evidence from 19<sup>th</sup> century Germany," working paper.

### 3. Culture

**Student's presentation:** Nunn, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon, 2011. "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa,"

Wolcott, Susan and Clark, Gregory, 1999. "Why Nations Fail: Managerial Decisions and Performance in Indian Cotton Textiles, 1890-1938," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 59(2), pp. 397-423.

Henrich, Joseph et al., 2001, "In search of homo economicus: Experiments in 15 small-scale societies," *American Economic Review*, 91(2): 73-79.

Fisman, Ray and Edward Miguel, 2007. "Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from diplomatic parking tickets," *American Economic Review*, 97(5): 1201-1217.