MENGQI ZHANG

Department of Economics, University of Colorado Boulder, 256 UCB Boulder, CO 80309 +1(720)-266-8863 mengqi.zhang@colorado.edu https://sites.google.com/colorado.edu/mengqi-zhang

EDUCATION

Expected 2024
2019
2017
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permitted more persuasion attempts, the experiments he conducts during each attempt will transmit less information and leads to \piecemeal" information disclosure. With more opportunities to persuade, a small rate of success in each attempt accumulates into a large one, thereby making the sequential persuasion more e ective than the static persuasion.

\Price Signal in Conspicuous Consumption"

(Invited Resubmission at Management Science)

In conspicuous consumption, if consumers lack information on actual demand, they are uncertain about the exclusivity for which they are willing to pay a premium. We show that the price set by a monopolistic seller who has full knowledge of demand distribution can serve as a signal for consumers to estimate the exclusivity of the product, which is essential for supporting conspicuous consumption. Conspicuous consumption supported by the price signal mechanism exhibits a conventional pattern of selling to fewer consumers at a higher markup. However, the nature of this mechanism tends to cause consumers to underestimate the conspicuous value, sometimes resulting in a loss for the seller or even the elimination of conspicuous consumption. Our ndings are robust in contexts where consumer types are subject to binary and continuous distribution.

\Income E ect and Product Quality in Conspicuous Consumption"

For conspicuous consumption to occur, certain price levels must exclude low-income consumers while retaining as many high-income consumers as possible to create exclusivity. This phenomenon necessitates the income e ect if consumers with di erent incomes share similar preferences for a status good. However, as a result of the income e ect, the direct value determined by product quality and the conspicuous value determined by exclusivity may act as substitutes for consumers. Therefore, when a product becomes a status good, its quality may decrease. Consumers who purchase a good solely for its direct value may incur a loss, and the market may experience a decrease in e ciency. Moreover, the quality decline of a status good reduces the e ectiveness of price as a signal of product quality, whereas a high price indicates only high quality if the good is an ordinary good under the same conditions.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

\Counterfeiting as a Signal of Exclusivity in Conspicuous Consumption"

\Buying to Qualify: Manufactured Purchases and Scarcity Pricing in the Luxury Market"

\Optimal Pricing under Mechanism and Persuasion Designs"

PRESENTATION (CONFERENCE AND WORKSHOP)

2023 Midwest International Trade & Theory Conference	November 10-12, 2023 (Scheduled)
2023 INFORMS Annual Meeting (Phoenix, AZ)	October 15-18, 2023 (Scheduled)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor

Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory Fall 2019

Teaching Assistant

Intermediate Microeconomic Theory Spring 2022, Fall 2022

Introduction to Statistics with Computer Applications

Fall 2023

Principles of Microeconomics	Spring 2018, Spring 2020 - Fall 2021
Principles of Macroeconomics	Fall 2017, Fall 2018, Spring 2019, Spring 2023
Natural Resource Economics	Fall 2017
Advanced Microeconomic Theory	Fall 2015

ACADEMIC AWARDS

Sieglinde Talbott Haller Endowed Economics Scholarship	2021
Paula M. Hildebrandt Economics Graduate Student Support Award	2020
Morris E. Garnsey Fellowship	2019
Yordon Prize in Microeconomics	2018
Robert and Lauri McNown Award	2018
Bacon Family Fellowship	2017

LANGUAGES

Mandarin (Native), Cantonese (Native), English (Fluent)

REFERENCES

Jin-Hyuk Kim
Associate Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
University of Colorado Boulder
jinhyuk.kim@colorado.edu

Yongmin Chen
Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
University of Colorado Boulder
yongmin.chen@colorado.edu

Piotr Dworczak
Associate Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
piotr.dworczak@northwestern.edu

Chuan He
Professor of Strategy,
Entrepreneurship and Operations
Leeds School of Business
University of Colorado Boulder
chuan.he@colorado.edu